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5.1  Introduction 
One of the principal effects of government policy is redistribution of 
the  social product.  To  some extent this is accidental,  the result  of 
policies designed to achieve other goals. But there are also systematic 
attempts in most developed countries to influence the distribution of 
income. In this paper we present a model that uses the government’s 
penchant for redistribution  to explain the intertemporal  behavior of 
government deficits, trade deficits, and capital formation. The argument 
is couched in terms of an overlapping-generations economy in which 
the endowments of generations differ and fiscal policy consists of in- 
tergenerational transfers. The emphasis on redistribution distinguishes 
the analysis from  the  efficiency-based theories  of  Barro  (1 979) and 
Kydland and Prescott (1980), who postulate that tax policy is designed 
to minimize the welfare losses associated with distortionary taxation. 
To  emphasize this difference, we assume instead that taxes are lump 
sum and explain their configuration entirely in terms of redistributive 
goals. 
Taken at face value, the goal of government policy in  our model is 
to maximize a welfare function which depends on generational utilities. 
Interpreted more broadly, the theory suggests that when capital markets 
are incomplete, the government can increase aggregate welfare by using 
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its own borrowing and lending opportunities  to expand consumers’ 
opportunity sets. The overlapping-generations framework is simply a 
metaphor for these capital market imperfections. the result is essen- 
tially a theory of “income-smoothing”: the government, in an attempt 
to moderate differences in utility between generations, taxes the rich 
and gives to the poor. 
Within this framework we show the following: First, the government 
in a small, open, pure-exchange economy can exploit its access to long- 
term capital markets to smooth fluctuations in private agents’ income 
streams. In this case government deficits coincide exactly with deficits 
in the balance of trade. Second, when goods are storable, they provide 
an alternative method of smoothing income. In an open economy, how- 
ever, consumption and investment decisions are separable; the exact 
identity between government deficits and trade deficits is broken, al- 
though they remain correlated. Third, in a world composed of many 
economies there are no policy conflicts if all countries are small in the 
sense of being price-takers. The equilibrium resulting from each coun- 
try’s smoothing its own income stream is efficient from a global view- 
point. Finally, the theory implies that tests of the Ricardian equivalence 
theorem based on aggregate time series have no power: if the govern- 
ment redistributes income optimally, aggregate consumption behaves 
exactly as if it were chosen by a single, infinitely-lived household. 
These points are developed in  sections 5.3-5.6.  Section 5.2 is de- 
voted to a brief look at the data. In the final section we comment on 
the strengths and weaknesses of the model and suggest extensions that 
seem particularly useful. 
5.2  Some Stylized Facts 
We  start with the fact that government tax revenues in most devel- 
oped countries are strongly procyclical. The top panels of figures 5.1 - 
5.5 illustrate this for the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Japan. Recent work by Sahasakul (1983) on U.S. per- 
sonal income tax reveals that both average and marginal tax rates are 
procyclical as well, probably  reflecting the automatic response  of a 
progressive income tax. We  plan further work to examine this conten- 
tion more closely. 
Since government spending on goods and services varies little over 
the business cycle, consumers’ consumption of the public good exhibits 
almost no cyclical tendency despite large variations in  payment  for 
these services. The implication is that government deficits are coun- 
tercyclical. This is easily verified using the bottom panels of the figures, 
where government deficits (excluding interest payments) for the same 175  A Positive Theory of Fiscal Policy in Open Economies 
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five countries are shown. The bottom panels also show the behavior 
of net exports. The strong but imperfect negative correlation between 
the  two predicted above is  apparent  in  most  of  the countries.  For 
example, the sharp fiscal expansions in  the United  Kingdom in  the 
early 1970s and in Canada in 1974-75 both were accompanied by sharp 
declines in net exports. The behavior of the two deficits during the last 
couple of  years in the charts is of  particular interest. The U.S. data 
show clearly the inverse correlation between  the government deficit 
and the trade surplus, while for some of the other countries net exports 
have grown over the past few years, regardless of the behavior of their 
own government deficits. The suggestion is that their net exports are 
influenced significantly by  U.S. policy. Similar remarks can be made 176  David BackusDMichael DevereudDouglas Purvis 
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Fig. 5.2  Canada real GNP and tax revenue (first differences) (top), 
Canada primary deficit and net exports (bottom) 
about other episodes where the two series are positively correlated in 
various countries, including the United States. This underscores the 
need for a multicountry framework like that begun in section 5.4. 
5.3  Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Pure Exchange Economy 
We  make the case for income-smoothing in an overlapping-generations 
economy with identical two-period consumers who have log-linear pref- 
erences  and make  no bequests.  As in  Levine  (1983), population  is 
constant and there is a single commodity available each period.  The 
absence of bequest motives is clearly important in providing an incen- 
tive for public  income-smoothing  (Barro,  1974). None  of  the  other 
elements is necessary, but they make the analysis simpler. 177  A Positive Theory of Fiscal Policy in Open Economies 
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Fig. 5.3  United Kingdom real GNP and tax revenue (first differences) 
(top), 
United Kingdom primary deficit and net exports (bottom) 
The object is to compare two types of equilibria: a competitive equi- 
librium with no government and a welfare optimum supported by lump- 
sum taxes and transfers. Each is examined in both a closed economy, 
in which prices clear markets, and in an open economy facing prices 
fixed in world markets. We  view the welfare optimization  as an ap- 
proximation to actual government behavior and as the basis for a pos- 
itive theory of fiscal policy. 
The fundamental building blocks of the model are the consumers. 
The representative of generation t is alive in periods t and t  +  1 and 
is endowed with amounts (u,, b,, I) of the commodity in each of these 
two periods. The aggregate endowment of commodity t is therefore 
(1)  el = a, + b,. 178  David Backus/Michael DevereudDouglas Purvis 
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Fig. 5.4  Germany real GNP  and tax revenue (first differences) (top), 
Germany primary deficit and net exports (bottom) 
Preferences over consumption in the two periods, denoted c, and d,  + I, 
are characterized by the utility function 
(2) 
If the price of commodity  t is p,,  then consumers choose c,  and d,+l 
to maximize utility, subject to the budget constraint 
(3) 
where P,+~  is the perfectly anticipated price in the second period of 
generation t's life. The demand functions are 
(4) 
UfC,,d,+l) = log c, + (3 log dt+l. 
PrC, + Pf+,~f+I  5  Pt4 + Pt+lbf+l, 
c, = (1  + a)-Yp,4 + Pt+lbt+l)/P, 
dt+l = 41  + (3)P1(Pr4  + Pf+lbf+l)/Pf+1. 179  A Positive Theory of Fiscal Policy in Open Economies 
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Fig. 5.5  Japan real GNP and tax revenue (first differences) (top), 
Japan primary deficit and net exports (bottom) 
In the closed economy a competitive equilibrium is characterized by 
a sequence of prices, {p1,p2,  . . .}, or one-period rates of interest, r, = 
p,/p,+  I  - 1, satisfying the equilibrium conditions 
(5) 
In  period  2  and  after this  implies that  prices  satisfy  the difference 
equation 
c, + dr = e,, t = 1,2, . . . .  . 
(6)  bt+I~t+l-  + brlpr  + aar-Ipr-1  = 0. 
But in period  1 generation 0 has, in addition to its endowment, some 
savings from the previous period, which it spends in  period  1. With 
only one good per period this expenditure cannot depend on relative 
prices. We  introduce some price sensitivity with a now familiar device 180  David Backus/Michael DevereudDouglas Purvis 
by  representing  generation 0’s savings by a fixed, arbitrary quantity 
denominated in period 0 prices, denoted M,  and referred to as “money.” 
The old generation now has a trivial choice problem, whose solution 
involves consuming its endowment plus whatever its holdings of money 
will buy: 
(7)  dl = bl + Mlp,. 
A competitive equilibrium is therefore a solution to the difference equa- 
tion satisfying the initial condition, 
(8)  aalpl  + b2p2 + (1  + a)M = 0. 
In fact there is a continuum of equilibria of  this sort, indexed by p1 
and differing in the level of consumption of generation 0. This inde- 
terminacy does not appear in  the welfare-maximizing solution so we 
disregard it for the moment. 
The model is a special case of the overlapping-generations economies 
studied by Balasko and Shell (1980; 1981a, b). They prove under more 
general conditions than those used here that a competitive equilibrium 
exists and  that  the competitive allocation  is  weakly  Pareto-optimal 
(there are no Pareto-improving redistributions involving a finite number 
of consumers). The equilibrium allocation is Pareto-optimal if  prices 
shrink at least as fast as the aggregate endowment (the interest rate is 
greater than or equal to the rate of growth of the economy). To see 
what this implies for our model, consider the case where each gener- 
ation has the same endowment (a,b). Then the difference equation for 
prices is 
(9)  bpt+l - (CUI  + b)p, + ~apf-1  = 0. 
Its characteristic equation has two roots, 1 and aalb. The first stems 
from the homogeneity of  demand functions; the second tells us that 
the rate of interest approaches (aalb) - 1. If this is positive, as it will 
be if young consumers save, then the equilibrium is Pareto-efficient. 
In fact this condition suffices even if the endowment is bounded but 
varies over time. 
Even if the equilibrium is Pareto-optimal, the government may prefer 
transfer schemes that help some generations at the expense of others. 
Another theorem from Balasko and Shell (1980) assures us that any 
efficient allocation can be supported as a competitive equilibrium by 
a system of lump-sum transfers. The question is which allocations the 
government is likely to prefer. One useful welfare function treats gen- 
erations similarly, but  places greater weight on those closest to the 
present: 
(10)  w = CPfUr, 181  A Positive Theory of Fiscal Policy in Open Economies 
where 0 < P < 1 is a discount factor, u,  is the utility of generation t, 
and the sum is over current and future generations. The welfare func- 
tion is utilitarian  with the exception of the discount factor, which  is 
needed to ensure a solution to the infinite-horizon programming prob- 
lem. In the present case W is given by 
3 
W =  p' [log c, + alog d,+l]. 
f=O  (1  1) 
Because utility is additively separable, the value of c,,  does not affect 
the optimal plan. 
In a closed economy the welfare optimum is obtained by maximizing 
W subject to the aggregate resource constraints, 
(12) 
The solution to the problem involves 
(13) 
d, = (1 - O)e,  t=  1,2,  ...  , 
where 8  = p/(a + p). Note in particular that the allocation to gener- 
ation 0, dl,  is determined by the condition that its marginal utility equal 
the discounted marginal  utility  of cI. The shadow prices  associated 
with the constraints are 
(14)  p, = (a  + P)P'-'/e,. 
With  a  constant endowment stream this  implies  an interest rate of 
(I - p)/p > 0. More generally the rate of interest is determined by the 
ratio of next period's endowment to this period's: 
(15)  1 + r, = e,+,/pe,. 
Supporting this allocation as a competitive equilibrium requires the 
government to redistribute income, and there are a number of ways to 
do this. Basically the government must shift the budget constraints of 
consumers so  that their after-tax incomes equal the values  of their 
expenditures: 
(16) 
Clearly there is no unique way to accomplish this.  The government 
can, with the same effect, transfer purchasing power to a generation 
when its members are young or when its members are old. For sim- 
plicity, we adopt the convention that the government transfers credits 
to each generation equal to the difference between its current endow- 
ment and its consumption at the welfare optimum. This involves real 
transfers of, say, g,  to the young and h, to the old given by 
c, + d, 5 e,,  t = 1,2, . . . . 
c,  = 8 e, 
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(17)  g, = Oe, - a, 
h,  = (1 - O)e, - 6,. 
It should be clear from the resource constraint that the government’s 
budget is always balanced: 
(18)  g, + h,  = 0. 
As a result, only limited smoothing is possible: the only feasible transfer 
schemes in this economy involve redistribution of the endowment be- 
tween generations in the same period. 
Let us turn now to an open economy facing fixed world prices. The 
possibility of trading with the rest of the world means that aggregate 
consumption need no longer equal the economy’s endowment every 
period. In an economy with no government, the competitive allocation 
is given by the demand functions of the various consumers evaluated 
at world prices. The trade balance, tb,, is defined by 
(19)  t b, = e, -  (c, + d,) 
= (a, - c,) + (6, - d,). 
Since the budget of any generation is balanced, a trade deficit is simply 
the result of less saving by the young than dissaving by the old. 
The open economy also gives rise to additional possibilities for pol- 
icy. The government can effectively transfer purchasing power from 
one generation to another by borrowing and lending in  world capital 
markets. If  prices converge to zero and the aggregate endowment is 
bounded, then the government’s constraint can be expressed as a pres- 
ent value: 
m  m 
where Fo is the net foreign asset position of the economy, measured 
in units of commodity 0. The solution to this problem involves demands 
of 
(21)  c, = P‘  [(I - P)/(a + P)IY/P, 
d, = UP‘-  I  [(I  - PY(a + PI1  Yip,, 
where  Y is the value of the economy’s endowment: 
m 
Y = C p,er + ZJ,F,. 
,=I 
If  prices in the world economy decline at rate p, as they would if  the 
world had  a constant endowment and were  managed  as the closed 183  A Positive Theory of Fiscal Policy in Open Economies 
economy above was, then c and d would be constant. Otherwise the 
plan will respond to fluctuations in prices, which we can think of  as 
arising from fluctuations in the world endowment. As with the allo- 
cation of risk, idiosyncratic variations can be eliminated by the market, 
but aggregate variations cannot. 
The implied tax policy again has the ambiguity noted earlier. If we 
retain the convention that transfers are made when they are consumed, 
the government runs a deficit when its country’s endowment is small, 
relative to the norm, and a surplus when its endowment is large. The 
fluctuations in the government deficit are matched exactly by the trade 
balance. In a sense consumers, taken as a group, use the government’s 
ability to borrow and lend to expand their opportunity set. Since the 
constraints for the closed economy are more restrictive than those for 
the open economy, the latter always achieves at least as high a level 
of welfare; the gains from intertemporal trade are nonnegative. 
The following examples illustrate  the salient features of the open 
economy under laissez-faire and the optimal tax policy. 
Example 5.3.1. Consider an economy with  (Y  =  1, p = 0.9, and an 
endowment (a,  ,b,+  ,)  that alternates  between  (3,l) (t odd) and (3,2) 
(t even). The aggregate endowment thus varies between 4 (r even) and 
5 (t odd). With p, = pt the competitive allocation alternates between 
(c, ,d,) = (1.95, 2.67) (t odd) and (2.40, 2.17) (t  even), the trade balance 
between 0.38 (t odd) and -0.43 (t  even). If generation 0 is treated the 
same way (it consumes 2.40 and 2.67), the value of the welfare function 
is  16.60. The welfare optimum, on the other hand, involves constant 
levels of consumption: c = 2.18 and d = 2.42. The trade balance and 
government deficit alternate between 0.32 (t  odd) and -0.60  (t even). 
The value of the welfare function is  16.70. (This uses the same net 
foreign asset position as the competitive equilibrium, namely, the dif- 
ference between generation 0’s first-period endowment, 3, and its first- 
period consumption, 2.4. Y is then 41.34.) 
Example 5.3.2. Suppose that in example 5.3.1 the world endowment 
is perfectly correlated with the domestic endowment and that prices 
are given by pr = (1/5)pf  (t odd) and pt = (1/4)pf (t even). Then there 
are no opportunities for improving on the competitive equilibrium. The 
competitive equilibrium and the welfare optimum are identical. The 
analogy with risk-sharing should be obvious. If we view this as a prop- 
osition in trade theory, we see that there are no gains from trade when 
countries have the same preferences and endowments. 
Example 5.3.3. With a = 1 and p = 0.9, let the endowment of gen- 
eration t be (2,l + 6‘+’),  with 6 = 0.7. The aggregate endowment in 184  David BackusMichael DevereudDouglas Punis 
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period t is therefore 3 + 8‘.  Assume again that world prices are given 
by pr = pr. Since the endowment is shrinking, the competitive equi- 
librium has consumption declining over time, as shown in table 5.1. 
Treating generation 0 the same way gives us an initial foreign asset 
position of 0.24 and a welfare value of  9.58. 
The value  of  the economy’s endowment, including  Fo = 0.24,  is 
28.94,  which corresponds to a “permanent”  aggregate  consumption 
level of 3.21.  Equating the marginal utilities of young and old allows 
us  to divide this  into  c = 1.52 and d = 1.69.  With  the endowment 
shrinking, the trade balance is initially positive, declines gradually, and 
reaches a lower asymptote of  -0.06.  The value of the welfare function 
is 9.62.  . 
5.4  Implications for International Policy Coordination 
The world  economy is a  closed  system, so we might  expect the 
closed-economy theory of the previous section to describe the optimal 
world equilibrium. We show that decentralized policymaking replicates 
the efficient  world  allocation if  individual countries are too small to 
affect world  prices  by  their own actions.  Large countries, however, 
may want to exploit their ability to influence prices to raise domestic 
welfare at the expense of the rest of the world. As in Frenkel and Razin 
(1984), the world economy has a fixed endowment, so policies designed 
to change consumption  in one country must change consumption in 
the rest of the world by an equal and opposite amount. Our guess is 
that optimal fiscal policy by a large economy is “beggar thy neighbor,” 
but developing this argument remains a task for the future. 
We  begin by deriving efficient worldwide tax policies. We  say that 
an allocation is policy-efficient if  (i) it is Pareto-efficient, in the sense 
that welfare in any particular country cannot be raised without lowering 
welfare in at least one other country, and (ii) the value of an economy’s 185  A Positive Theory of Fiscal Policy in Open Economies 
consumption equals, at equilibrium prices, the value of its endowment. 
Note that condition (i) defines Pareto-optimality in terms of  welfare 
functions of countries, rather than utilities of individual consumers. 
Condition  (ii) guarantees that the allocation  can  be  supported  as a 
competitive equilibrium without net transfer payments between coun- 
tries. The two suffice to determine a unique allocation, which can be 
supported as a competitive equilibrium with the appropriate choice of 
lump-sum taxes. 
We  derive the policy-efficient allocation by looking first at Pareto- 
efficient allocations.  If there are n countries, indexed by  i,  then any 
efficient allocation is the solution to a problem of the form, 
max w = 2 ,riwi,  27~;  = 1,  (23) 
subject to the world resource constraints, for some choice of the welfare 
weights ,ri.  To make this tractable, assume that countries have identical 
preferences but different endowments. As in section 5.3, the welfare 
of an individual country is given by 
(24) 
where we have introduced additional subscripts to distinguish coun- 
tries. The world resource constraint is 
(c;,,  + d;.,) I  2 ei,f,  t  = 1,2, . . .  (25) 
If the world endowment, e,, is bounded, so that a solution to the global 
welfare problem exists, and if pt  are the shadow prices associated with 
the constraints, then the first-order conditions are 
i 
m 
w;  = 2 P'  [log Ci., + ah  d;,t+,l, 
t=O 
. 
i  i 
(26)  Wkt  = Pt 
,ri Pt-'aldi., = pt, 
i = 1,2, . . . ,n,  t  = 1,2, . . . 
The shadow prices, which give the market prices of  the competitive 
equilibrium that supports this allocation, are 
(27)  pt = (a + P)P'-'/e,. 
(The fact that these are independent of the nis is an artifact of  the 
countries' having identical, homothetic preferences.) 
Now let us compute the welfare weights. If we impose condition (ii), 
then for each country 
(28)  2  Pt(Ci.f + di,)  = 2 Prei., + POFi.0 = yi. 
t=  I  I= I 186  David BackusMichael DevereudDouglas Purvis 
In the present case this implies that the welfare weight is 
(29)  ITi  = Yj/[(l  + .L/p)cpt] 
= (1 -  P)ZP‘-’(ej./e,)  + P~F;.~. 
In short, the weight varies inversely with the country’s wealth relative 
to the world as a whole. 
The question is whether this policy-efficient allocation  can be at- 
tained by decentralized policymaking. Will the Nash solution-in  which 
each country  chooses taxes to maximize its own  welfare,  given its 
budget constraint, the taxes of other countries, and the world equilib- 
rium condition-be  policy-efficient? The answer depends upon  how 
governments view prices.  At  one extreme we  might consider  small 
economies, whose decisions have no influence on world prices. It should 
be clear by analogy with the second welfare theorem that the policy- 
efficient allocation is the best any such country can attain. Decentral- 
ized policymaking is efficient. 
The question is whether this decentralization result extends to policy 
coordination between large countries. Our intuition is that it does not, 
but we have yet to specify a model in which policy conflicts lead to 
suboptimal allocations. 
5.5  Fiscal Policy in a Model with Capital 
We  saw in  section 5.2 that while government deficits and trade bal- 
ances are positively correlated, the correlation is hardly as close as 
predicted by the pure-exchange model. One reason might be physical 
capital, which provides  an alternative method  of  transferring goods 
between periods and which is, as an empirical matter, closely related 
to both national income and the balance of trade. 
We  examine the interplay of trade deficits,  capital formation, and 
fiscal policy in a variant of the Diamond (1965) debt model, used re- 
cently in a similar context by  Persson (1985). We  add to the model of 
section 5.3 the possibility of using some or all of the current endow- 
ment, which we now refer to as “labor,” to produce output next period. 
In  the simplest model each unit of labor produces one unit of “output,” 
which is divided between consumption and capital. Capital is converted 
into next-period output by the production process Ah,  with 0 < y < 1. 
The representative of generation t therefore consumes c,  and invests 
k,,,  in  period  t.  In  period  t  +  1  it  consumes  dt+l,  financed  by  its 
endowment, production, and saving from period  t. The overall con- 
straint is 
(30)  PLC~  + kt+l) + ~t+ldt+l  5  Ptat  +Pt+lbt+l  + Ar+lkr+lYl. 187  A Positive Theory of Fiscal Policy in Open Economies 
Utility maximization yields the demand functions 
(31)  c,  = (1  + a)-'y,/p, 
dt+I = 41  + a)-IY,/Pt+l 
k,+  1  = (YA+  lPt+ I~PAU7 
where u =  1/(1  -  y) and 
(32)  ~r  = Ptar  + ~t+~bt+l  + (YIP,)"  (A~+IP,+I)'+*. 
A  competitive equilibrium in  a closed economy is a sequence of 
prices satisfying the equilibrium conditions. 
(33) 
As before we can express this as a difference equation in prices, but 
unlike the pure-exchange model  it  is highly  nonlinear.  The welfare 
optimum is derived by maximizing W, given in section 5.3, subject to 
the resource constraints. 
(34) 
The optimal policy is essentially the  solution to an optimal growth 
problem. One of its interesting features is that the steady-state rate of 
interest,  (1 - p)/p > 0, does not  depend  on how  individual agents 
discount the future (the parameter a). This characteristic and others 
are described by Samuelson (1967) and Calvo and Obstfeld (1985). 
Our interest, however,  lies in the small, open economy, which is 
considerably easier to study because prices are exogenous and demand 
decisions are completely separate from investment decisions. In the 
laissez-faire equilibrium, the competitive allocation is described fully 
by the demand functions stated earlier. The capital stock is determined 
solely by prices, and the returns to capital and labor are then consumed 
and saved as prescribed by the demand functions and the distribution 
of income. Generations with larger endowments and higher profits from 
capital consume more than others. 
The welfare optimum is computed much as before. If prices converge 
to zero and the endowment is bounded, then we can again express the 
government's constraint as an infinite sum: 
c,  + d, + k,,, = e, + A&,.,  t  = 1,2,. . .  . 
c,  + d, + k,+' 5 e, + A,k,y,  f = 1,2, . . .  . 
The problem is recursive: the capital stock is determined by 
(36)  kt+  I  = (YA+  IPr+  l/~r)~, 
as before. From this we define the economy's wealth as 188  David BackudMichael DevereudDouplas Purvis 
and consume 
(38)  c,  = P"(1  - PI/(.  + P)1  YlP, 
d, = IxP'-'[(I  - P)/(cx + p)]Y/p,. 
The interest derives from the interaction between capital formation 
and trade. Consider, for example, an economy with constant endow- 
ment, e, and productivity, A.  If the world rate of  interest is constant 
at (1 -  @)/PI then consumption is constant and the capital stock ap- 
proaches its steady-state value, 
(39)  k*  = (YAP)". 
A positive shock to the endowment simply raises  Y, which increases 
consumption  in  all  periods.  As in  section 5.3,  this raises  the trade 
balance in the period of the shock and lowers it in other periods since 
domestic consumption is higher. Alternatively, consider a temporary 
rise in the productivity parameter, A.  This raises the demand for capital 
that period and also raises the economy's wealth, which raises con- 
sumption slightly in every period. The trade balance, given by 
(40)  tb, = (e, + A,k,.) -  (c,  + d, + k,+A 
will fall when the capital is imported, rise the next period when the 
capital is used in production, and fall slightly in other periods because 
the economy now consumes more each period. Both of these features 
are illustrated in the following examples. 
Example 5.5.1. Let a = 1,  P = y  = .8, A  = a  = e =  1, and b  = 0, 
and consider the behavior of the economy when world prices oscillate, 
as they would if  the world endowment were oscillating. To make this 
concrete, let p, = p' when t is even, and 2p' when t is odd. In both 
the competitive and optimal equilibria the capital stock, k,, is 3.436 
when r is even, 0.0034 when t is odd. These fluctuations in the capital 
stock, which make even generations much richer, lead to a competitive 
equilibrium in which the utilities of the two generations fluctuate along 
with prices. Consumption, production, and the trade balance are given 
by 
C,  d,  tb,  4 
2.684  1.251  -6.361  1.281  t even 
0.500  1.342  2.591  -  0.468  t odd 
The value of the welfare function is 2.28. 
The welfare optimum smooths these fluctuations somewhat, although 
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do better  since  they  face  a lower  rate  of  interest.  We  start with 
Fo = -  5.12, the dissaving of generation 0 in its first period of life and 
compute the optimal allocation of total income, Y = 15.18. Quantities 
are 
c,  4  tb,  4 
1.687  2.107  -  6.220  0.575  t even 
0.843  1.054  2.536  0.575  t odd 
which imply a welfare value of 2.30. 
Example 5.5.2. With the same parameter values and pr =  pf,  we ex- 
amine an economy in which the productivity parameter, A,, oscillates 
between 1 (t odd) and 2 (t even). The capital stock therefore oscillates 
between 0.107 and 3.436. The trade balance is driven by the need to 
import capital goods in odd periods, and the output from those capital 
goods in even periods, and alternates between  -3.84  and 4.587. The 
discrepancy in utility between generations brought about by this vari- 
ation in the productivity of capital is eliminated completely in the wel- 
fare solution, which raises W from -  1.80 to -0.72. 
5.6  On Testing the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem 
One of the consequences of the government's income-smoothing is 
that the aggregate economy behaves like a single infinite-horizon con- 
sumer. If government policy is approximately as we have modeled it, 
then tests of debt neutrality based on aggregate time series data have 
very little power. The result is based on the following idea: the essential 
difference between an overlapping-generations economy and an econ- 
omy with infinitely-lived agents is that the latter can redistribute pur- 
chasing power across time without restraint, but the former cannot. 
But suppose that the government performs this redistribution  as we 
have described. Then there is no longer any need for further redistri- 
bution and the two models are observationally equivalent. 
The argument is quite general, but a statement based on log-linear 
preferences should suffice to communicate its essential elements. 
Proposition. Consider the model of section 5.3. The demand for ag- 
gregate consumption, C, = c, + d,, associated with the welfare prob- 
lem is identical to that of a single infinitely-lived consumer with en- 
dowment {el,e2,  . . .} and utility function 
(41)  I/ = zp'logc,. 
The proof is straightforward. We  know that the welfare optimum in- 
volves equating the discounted marginal utilities of the young and old: 
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Since the utility functions are homothetic this implies that the ratio of 
c,  to d, is a fixed number independent of  t, in this case 
(43)  c,ld, = P/a. 
Now aggregate consumption can be expressed 
(44)  c,  =(I  + (Y/P)c,, 
and the utility function, U,  and welfare function, W,  are equivalent. 
Now consider tests of the neutrality proposition, of which Aschauer 
(1985) is a nice example (and a good source of other references). The 
standard approach is to assume that aggregate consumption is the out- 
come of  an infinite-horizon optimization. The optimization  has  the 
property that the timing of taxes, and therefore the value of currently 
outstanding debt, is irrelevant-the  Ricardian equivalence theorem. It 
also imposes testable restrictions on the behavior of aggregate con- 
sumption, taxes, and debt. Aschauer, for one, finds that the data cannot 
reject the restrictions and therefore support the theorem. Our propo- 
sition, however, says that if the government manipulates taxes to smooth 
income, then our model, in which the timing of taxes is central, cannot 
be distinguished empirically from his. His test has no power and pro- 
vides as much support for our model as for his. 
5.7  Final Remarks 
We  have argued that distributional objectives provide an incentive 
for fiscal  authorities to smooth the incomes of  private  agents.  The 
details were developed in a model with two-period agents, overlapping 
lives and log-linear preferences,  but  we  think  its  main features are 
considerably more general. A quick look at some data suggests that 
the theory agrees, at least roughly, with observed variations in aggre- 
gate income, government deficits, and trade balances. 
Despite  this somewhat cursory  empirical verification, there are a 
number of  theoretical  extensions that appear to us worth pursuing. 
First, we would like to extend the theory to scholastic environments, 
in  which fluctuations  in  the endowment stream are to some degree 
unpredictable. In these environments income-smoothing amounts to 
risk-sharing. Gordon and Varian (1985) have taken this route in a model 
with a similar structure, and their insights would be useful here as well. 
Second, and perhaps more important to the open economy issues, we 
would like to introduce a nontraded good, so that some of  the impact 
of changes in the intertemporal pattern of  consumption opportunities 
can be taken in the form of changes in  the domestic relative  price. 
Third, the conditions on the decentralization result of section 5.4 might 
be examined more closely. We  argued, in short, that there are costs of 191  A Positive Theory of Fiscal Policy in Open Economies 
uncoordinated policies only if  some countries are large, in the sense 
of  being able to influence world prices by  their own actions. Kehoe 
(1987) presents a counterexample, in which the global costs of decen- 
tralized fiscal policy rise as the number of countries grows. Finally, the 
model could be made richer by allowing for generational heterogeneity, 
so that fiscal policy might involve redistribution both within and across 
generations. In fact, the procyclical nature of  tax rates in  developed 
countries may  simply be the accidental consequence of  progressive 
taxation within generations. 
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COIlln’leIlt  Stanley Fischer 
Backus, Devereux, and Purvis (BDP) present a very clean theoretical 
paper that explains its assumptions and conclusions and leaves little 
for the discussant to do except to provide an intuitive explanation of 
the results and to talk about their relevance to real world fiscal policy. 
The facts that the positive theory is called upon to explain are that 
budget deficits are countercyclical and net exports are procyclical- 
sometimes. Thus there is a “strong but imperfect” negative correlation 
between them. Theory tells us the negative relationship should indeed 
be imperfect.  The cyclical character of  net exports depends on the 
disturbances moving the economy. 
First consider aggregate demand policy disturbances. In the floating 
exchange rate Mundell-Fleming model, with a given level of govern- 
ment spending and fixed tax rates, monetary expansion causes both 
the budget deficit and net exports to decrease. The association will be 
positive  in  that case.  Fiscal  expansion causes the budget  deficit to 
increase and net exports to decrease. There will be a negative corre- 
lation between the budget deficit and net exports, but the budget deficit 
will be procyclical and net exports countercyclical. 
Neither of these cases corresponds to the BDP reading of their charts. 
Their case is rather one of aggregate supply or productivity disturb- 
ances. Their positive theory is that when output is high because of a 
productivity shock, countries both lend abroad and raise taxes on the 
current generation for the benefit of later poorer generations. Thus in 
the presence of a favorable shock, a country will run a current account 
surplus to effect the lending, and a budget surplus because taxation is 
high. 
BDP’s underlying consumers are finite-lived finite-horizon maximiz- 
ers. The fiscal authority, however, takes the long view, maximizing a 
discounted weighted sum of generational utility levels. The fiscal au- 
thority’s actions effectively make the economy behave like one in which 
individuals have infinite horizons. Hence the interesting BDP argument 
that the economy behaves as if  Ricardian equivalence holds even though 
it is thoroughly non-Ricardian. 
That result seems close to a general result that in cases where sta- 
bilization policy can achieve first best solutions, the reduced form fails 
to show any effects of the policy. The general result goes back at least 
to Kareken and Solow,’ who gave the example of a situation in which 
Stanley Fischer is professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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Lags in fiscal and monetary policy, by Albert Ando et al., in Commission on 
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active anticipatory monetary policy succeeds in stabilizing output to 
the extent of  reducing GNP to a white noise process. Then there will 
be no correlation between  output and previous monetary policy.  Of 
course, if policy is not absolutely perfect, it will be possible to detect 
some of  its effects. In the BDP model, if  the fiscal authority makes 
mistakes, it will be possible to see individuals adjusting their lifetime 
consumption patterns to the debt-tax mix. 
Shocks in BDP are transitory. Consider a small country starting with 
a balanced budget and zero net exports that suffers a permanent fa- 
vorable productivity shock that affects the endowment of the young. 
What will happen to net exports and the budget? The first reaction is 
that consumption and output should rise by the same amount so there 
is no effect on net exports or the budget deficit. The presence of old 
people makes a difference though. The social welfare function requires 
them to share the bonanza. It also requires the burden of their increased 
consumption to be  shared with future generations. The government 
will issue some debt, appearing initially to run  a procyclical budget 
deficit. The result for the balance of payments is not obvious. 
BDP have  isolated  one particular  type  of  disturbance-transitory 
productivity shocks-for  which their analysis applies. Saudi Arabia in 
the first post-oil shock period fits such a case well. But there are many 
other types of disturbance for which other correlations would be ex- 
pected. Printed on the side of their paper should be the following notice. 
Warning: Correlations among endogenous variables are not indepen- 
dent of the shocks that move them. 
Comment  Kenneth Rogoff 
There are any number of plausible reasons why Ricardian equivalence 
may not hold: finite lives, tax distortions, imperfect capital markets, 
uncertain fertility, etc. However, as Barro (1974) points out, although 
many different reasons will imply that the timing of  taxes "matters," 
they do not all  suggest the same positive or normative conclusions. 
Backus, Devereux, and Purvis (BDP) posit that deficits are important 
because individuals do not leave bequests,' and they obtain some in- 
teresting results.  Ideally, however, one would eventually like to see 
how their main conclusions hold up in models where deficits matter 
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because taxes are distorting, or because of capital market imperfec- 
tions. The issue of robustness would be less important, of course, if 
one could amass empirical evidence showing that absence of bequests 
is by far the most important reason for the failure of Ricardian equiv- 
alence. (Barro [I9791 argues that tax distortions are more important.) 
The BDP model is closed by the assumption that governments smooth 
consumption across generations.2 Interestingly,  their  paradigm  sug- 
gests the possible  importance  of  certain shocks that have not  been 
conventionally  recognized  as major factors in  the  determination of 
government budget deficits. For example, suppose there is an unantic- 
ipated positive shock to the rate of technological progress. The BDP 
model would predict an increase in the budget deficit, as future gen- 
erations are now expected to be better off. There are, of course, other 
ways for society to transfer income across generations besides gov- 
ernment debt. The current generation can also transfer income to future 
generations by  increasing  expenditure on  education or by  reducing 
pollution. Clearly, the existence of these other margins of substitution 
does not imply that the deficits channel is insignificant. 
It is superficially anomalous that voters are willing to elect govern- 
ments that care about future generations and yet are not willing to leave 
bequests themselves. This is internally consistent, however, if the trend 
rate of growth of productivity is high and if there are legal restrictions 
on leaving private debt to one’s heirs.  Hence agents are at a corner 
solution in terms of private bequests and use government debt to achieve 
an interior maximum. Thus it is perfectly possible to observe symmetric 
responses of deficits to temporary positive and negative productivity 
shocks, as in the BDP model. (Symmetric, in terms of deviations from 
trend. It might require a very large positive shock to observe an actual 
The BDP model, interpreted literally, captures the effects of gov- 
ernment consumption smoothing across generations. Can it be inter- 
preted more broadly to explain what happens when the government 
smooths consumption on a very short-term basis? The answer to this 
question is not immediately obvious. If  individuals can borrow and 
lend at the same rate as the government, there would be no need for 
the government to run deficits. Again, it would be interesting to ask 
what types of capital market imperfections yield the same conclusions 
as the BDP’s no-bequests assumption. 
In  section 5.4,  BDP show that  the gains from policy cooperation 
among governments become small as the number of countries grows 
2.  BDPs analysis is related  to some analyses found in the social security 
literature;  see, for example, Samuelson (1975) or Feldstein  (1985).  Both  of 
these papers employ an OG model with no bequests and examine how income 
should be distributed across generations to maximize social welfare. 
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large. With an infinite number of countries, decentralized decision mak- 
ing yields a Pareto-optimal allocation. This is a model-specific result. 
Chari and Kehoe (1987) provide a natural example (in a model with 
distorting taxes) in which the cooperative equilibrium remains signif- 
icantly better than the noncooperative equilibrium, even as the number 
of countries grows large. Incidentally, there is no theoretical presump- 
tion that governments can always better attain their objectives by co- 
operating. Rogoff (1985) provides an example in  which the inflation 
credibility problems of  governments vis-his their own citizens are 
exacerbated when sovereign governments coordinate their monetary 
policy decisions. 
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